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Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. cared deeply about religion in America. He 
was not a secularist who cavalierly dismissed religion or who viewed it with 
barely-concealed contempt. Brennan's respect for the intensity of American 
religious life convinced him that religion raised enormous constitutional 
complexities that had to be addressed with caution and delicacy. 
Questions of religion were easiest for Brennan when formulated in terms 
of the rights of individuals freely to exercise their religious convictions. Rights 
to religious freedom were in this dimension like all fundamental individual 
rights; they were to be accorded the utmost respect. Even today, Brennan's 
opinion in Sherbert v. VernerI remains a canonical decision for those who 
believe that Free Exercise rights should receive the highest degree of 
constitutional protection. Brennan maintained his commitment o the rights 
established by the Free Exercise Clause throughout his career, as is well 
evidenced by his late dissent in Goldman v. Weinberger.2 
Brennan interpreted the Establishment Clause primarily in light of his 
focus on the Free Exercise Clause. He was determined that government 
involvement in religion not undermine religion itself,3 and he was for this 
reason committed to enforcing the entanglement prong of the Lemon test.4 He 
explained that "When the state becomes enmeshed within a given denomination 
in matters of religious significance, the freedom of religious belief of those who 
are not adherents of that denomination suffers .... In addition, the freedom of 
even the adherents of the denomination is limited by the government intrusion 
into sacred matters."5 As he said early on in 1963, in his magnificent 
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1. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
2. 475 U.S. 503, 513 (1986). 
3. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 340 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
4. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
5. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409-10 (1985). Brennan continued: '"[T]he First 
Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve 
their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.'" Aguilar at 410 
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concurring opinion in School District of Abington v. Schempp, "It is not only 
the nonbeliever who fears the injection of sectarian doctrines and controversies 
into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is the devout believer who fears the 
secularization of a creed which becomes too deeply involved with and 
dependent upon the government."6 
Brennan's summary of the four purposes of the Establishment Clause in 
Marsh v. Chambers7 demonstrates how deeply his interpretation f the Clause 
flowed from his allegiance to maintaining the integrity of religious practices. 
The Establishment Clause, Brennan argued, guarantees "the individual right to 
conscience" because it ensures that persons are not coerced to support, through 
taxes or otherwise, religious practices with which they disagree; it prevents 
"the state from interfering in the essential autonomy of religious life";9 it 
guards against "the trivialization and degradation of religion by too close an 
attachment to the organs of government";'0 and it seeks to "assure that 
essentially religious issues, precisely because of their importance and 
sensitivity, not become the occasion for battle in the political arena."'1 l
In McDaniel v. Paty Brennan even authored a concurring opinion 
asserting that the Establishment Clause would itself prohibit a Tennessee 
statute that barred clergy from serving as delegates to a Tennessee 
constitutional convention. 12 The case would seem most naturally to turn on the 
Free Exercise Clause, on the notion that the government could not prevent 
"sectarian bickering and strife . . . by"'3 suppressing religious speech or by 
interfering "with efforts to proselyte or worship in public places."'14 But 
Brennan nevertheless stretched to argue that "the Establishment Clause, 
properly understood, is a shield against any attempt by government o inhibit 
religion as it has done here."'15 
Underlying Brennan's support for a strong Establishment Clause lay his 
conviction that the very intensity of American religious belief required strict 
state neutrality. "[J]ust as religion throughout history has provided spiritual 
comfort, guidance, and inspiration to many," he wrote, "it can also serve 
powerfully to divide societies and to exclude those whose beliefs are not in 
accord with particular religions or sects that have from time to time achieved 
dominance. The solution to this problem ... is jealously to guard the right of 
(quoting McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948)). See Hunt v. McNair, 413 
U.S. 734, 752-53 (1973) (Brennan, J, dissenting). 
6. 374 U.S. 203, 259 (1963). 
7. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
8. Id. at 803. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 804. 
11. /?at 805. 
12. 435 U.S. 618(1978). 
13. Id. at 641. 
14. Id. at 640. 
15. Id. at 641. 
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every individual to worship according to the dictates of conscience while 
requiring the government o maintain a course of neutrality among religions, 
and between religion and nonreligion."'16 
For Brennan, in short, the Establishment Clause served ends that were 
closely allied to those of the Free Exercise Clause, which was to protect "the 
right of each individual voluntarily to determine what to believe (and what not 
to believe) free of any coercive pressures from the State, while at the same 
time" protecting "religious beliefs" from the "corrosive secularism" that would 
result from the entanglement of the government.17 Brennan believed that the 
Establishment Clause expressed the constitutional judgment that "in our 
society, religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the 
institutions of private choice."' 8 This judgment allowed Brennan 
simultaneously to affirm Free Exercise rights, which he deemed individual and 
private, and strongly to support Establishment Clause limitations on 
government entanglement with religion. 
The boundary between the private and public dimensions of religion was 
for Brennan a matter of historical and sociological contingency. As he said in 
Schempp, the boundary did not inhere in any ontologically immutable 
distinction between public action and private belief, but emerged instead out of 
the needs of a heterogeneous and conflicted nation: 
[O]ur religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people 
than were our forefathers.... In the face of such profound changes, 
practices which may have been objectionable to no one in the time of 
Jefferson and Madison may today be highly offensive to many 
persons, the deeply devout and the nonbelievers alike. l9 
At first the Establishment Clause required neutrality chiefly among the 
many different Protestant sects contending for predominance in the early 
republic. The Clause allowed government participation in Christian observance 
so long as the government remained "nonsectarian" when measured by disputes 
among these sects. But as the nation grew into a battleground between 
Protestants and Catholics, and then between Christians and Jews, and finally 
16. Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985). See County of Allegheny 
v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 644 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
17. Ball, 473 U.S. at 385. 
As Justice Frankfurter . . . observed, the Establishment Clause "[withdraws] from the 
sphere of legitimate legislative concern and competence a specific, but comprehensive 
area of human conduct: man's belief or disbelief in the verity of some transcendental 
idea and man's expression in action ofthat belief or disbelief." That the Constitution 
sets this realm of thought and feeling apart from the pressures and antagonisms of 
government is one of its supreme achievements. 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 726 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
18. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 802 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 625) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
19. 374 U.S. at 240-41. 
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between the religious and the non-religious, Brennan believed that the 
neutrality required by the Establishment Clause would have to evolve as well, 
although he always maintained that under the Establishment Clause the state 
could "recognize the religious beliefs and practices of the American people as 
an aspect of our history and culture."20 
The decisive question for Brennan was whether challenged state action 
affects a "symbolic union of church and state" that would likely "be perceived 
by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the 
nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices."2' 
Constitutionally mandated "sensitivity to the symbolic impact of the union of 
church and state"22 required close attention to social context. That is why 
Brennan so strongly objected to interpretations of the Establishment Clause 
which he regarded as "static and lifeless,"23 fixing the Clause's meaning "by 
the life experience of the Framers."24 Brennan's view is usually taken to reject 
what is now called "originalism." But on this interpretation they can instead be 
understood as an effort to apply the original purposes of the Clause to the 
changing historical circumstances of the nation. 
20. Mflr.s?,463U.S.at811. 
21. Ball, 473 U.S. at 390. 
22. Id. 
23. Mars/2,463 U.S. at 817. 
24. Id. at 816. 
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